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Judges of the German Federal Constitutional Court can be seen as both judicial and 
political elites. Yet, up to now there is no systematic work on the Court’s’ judges and 
especially their careers prior to their appointments. Using sequence analysis, I 
identify four relatively distinct clusters of career characteristics: academia, 
administration (and administrative courts), ordinary jurisdiction and politics. Judges 
whose career background is limited to the judicial sphere mostly advance from a level 
below the Länder to the Länder and then on to the federal level, while those with a 
background in politics or administration switch less often among them. Furthermore, I 
find little evidence to suggest that differences in the judges’ career paths can be 
explained by reference to the body that elected them (Bundestag or Bundesrat) or the 
party that nominated them (CDU/CSU or SPD). The article also illustrates the 
possibilities of sequence analysis for elite studies.  
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Again and again surveys show that the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) is among 
the most popular institutions with the German public.1 The FCC is in a strong judicial and 
political position when compared to other constitutional courts due to its institutional 
arrangement, its formal powers 2, and especially its high legitimacy. 3 Yet, contrary to its 
popularity and its wide range of power, research on the FCC – like on most other 
constitutional courts – has until recently been quite one-dimensional. Following the main 
argument in Alec Stone Sweet’s landmark book ‘Governing with Judges’4, most work on 
constitutional courts in Europe, including the German FCC 5 , has focused on the 
judicialization of politics 6  and the politicization of justice 7, aiming at defining ‘a proper 
balance of power between Parliament and the Constitutional Court’.8 Other scholars compared the 
FCC with other constitutional courts. They focused largely on formal powers, institutional 
independence, regulations regarding the appointment of judges, and the different ways in 
which the courts can take political action.9 Most recently, some authors have analysed how 
FCC decisions can effect changes or new interpretations of the Grundgesetz.10  
What is lacking, however, are systematic studies on the personal characteristics and the 
careers of the FCC judges: 11  a problem also identified by Robert van Ooyten and by 
Christoph Hönnige and Thomas Gschwend. 12  Dietrich Herrmann identifies five areas of 
research but in most of them he treats the FCC as a single institutional actor.13 Even most 
studies on the nomination, election or judicial decision making of FCC judges do not 
elaborate on the personal or career characteristics of the individual judges. 14  A notable 
exception is Christine Landfried who provides an overview of selected aggregate 
characteristics regarding the individual background of FCC judges. 15   Yet, biographic 
information – particularly in their sequential form – are essential if we want to get a more 
comprehensive picture of the Court and its working. In the following I will briefly discuss 
three focus areas of FCC research to exemplify why opening the institutional “black box” and 
paying closer attention to the career characteristics of the judges will advance our knowledge 
of the Court.  
 
1) Who becomes a judge at the FCC? 
Studies on the selection of political elites, e.g. ministers, have shown the importance of 
defining the pool of potential candidates.16 The number of potential candidates for the FCC 
cannot be limited to a small pool as all German lawyers who are at least 40 years old are 
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eligible for election, as long as three out of the eight judges from each senate come directly 
from one of the other five highest German courts. With a pool as large as in this case, it is 
impossible to determine all potential candidates for a meaningful and statistically sound test 
of the factors affecting the selection of FCC judges. Instead, as much information about the 
judges’ pre-FCC careers should be used. Based on this information it is at least possible to 
identify potentially distinct pathways leading to Karlsruhe, the seat of the FCC. Combining 
career data with personal characteristics such as age, gender or family background could 
improve the analysis further. In this article I nevertheless concentrate on career information. 
2) Is there a politicization of the FCC?  
The standard approach used in empirical work to test the politicization hypothesis is to focus 
on the judges’ nomination by political parties. An in-depth study of the career characteristics 
of FCC judges prior to election allows us to delve deeper into their political background and 
their relations to parties to see whether persons with a particular political background stand a 
better chance to be elected to the FCC. 
3) How can the decision making of the FCC be explained? 
In the United States the view is widely held that ‘judges make policy’, referring in particular 
to the Supreme Court.17 US scholars have advanced three possible explanations to understand 
the decision making process at the Court: 1) According to the legal model, judges decide 
solely in light of the respective case and the ‘plain meaning of the Constitution’18; 2) the 
attitudinal model assumes that judges decide in line with their ideological background, their 
attitudes and values 19; and 3) the rational choice model refines the attitudinal approach. 
According to the rational choice model judges try to get decisions passed that are as close as 
possible to their own ideal policy positions, which – as in the attitudinal model – are defined 
by the judges’ attitudes and values. Yet, rational choice theorists believe that the judges take 
part in strategic bargaining games with other relevant actors (other judges, the legislature, 
even the public) and are thus institutionally constrained in promoting their preferences.20 
Assuming that these three models can also (to some extent) explain the decision making of the 
German FCC, the need for more complete biographical information becomes obvious. 21 
Supposing that judges’ decisions could be explained by the legal model alone, information on 
career trajectories would not be of much relevance. In the other two models, however, 
knowing about careers is decisive as it increases the available information on individual 
actors. In these models, the starting points for explaining decisions are attitudes, values and 
preferences, and biographical information can serve to approximate these factors. In order to 
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find out whether a certain academic, jurisprudential or professional socialization influences 
decisions, it could for example be relevant to know at which universities the judges studied 
and in which areas they worked. 
While the first and – at least to some extent – the second focus area will be addressed in 
this article, the third one is an example for future research.22  
FOUR CONCRETE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Four research questions will be addressed in this article to provide insights on how 
systematic data on the judges’ careers can be applied.  
1) Can distinct career paths leading to the FCC be identified? 
2) Do pre-FCC careers involve a high degree involvement in political positions, thus 
suggesting a possible politicization of the Court?   
3) Does a federal system provide for particular career paths in the judiciary, and what are 
the implications? 
4) Are there differences between the judges’ careers with respect to the party that 
nominated them and the selecting body (Bundestag or Bundesrat)?  
The article applies sequence analysis to a newly compiled dataset comprising all judges 
who worked at the FCC between its establishment in 1951 and 2013. Sequence analysis, 
which is fairly new to political science, is particularly well suited for our purposes as it 
provides a holistic picture of the judges’ complete careers while enabling us to systematically 
compare the different career stages prior to FCC appointment. The following three sections 
provide the background for the main analysis. They introduce the basic organisational 
principles of the FCC, the data used, and the method of sequence analysis. The main analysis 
is presented in the subsequent section. The article concludes with an overview of the results.  
BASIC ORGANISATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THE FCC 
When examining the careers of FCC judges, it is important to keep in mind the constitutional 
and legal rules that make provisions for the general composition of the FCC and the question 
‘who is eligible as a judge?’23 
Two senates constitute the FCC, each comprising eight judges.24 Four judges of each 
senate are elected by the Bundesrat, the other four by a Bundestag committee consisting of 
twelve deputies.25 A candidate needs a 2/3-majority in the respective electing body to be 
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elected.26 Three judges of each senate have to be former judges at the highest federal courts.27 
Only fully qualified lawyers who are at least 40 years old are eligible. Judges join the FCC for 
one term of 12 years, without the possibility of reelection.28 At the age of 68, judges have to 
retire. FCC judges may not be members of the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, the federal 
government or the corresponding institutions at the Länder level while in office. 
These provisions are meant to protect the FCC from several potential problems:  
(1) The requirements regarding education and professional experience are intended to 
ensure that only technically qualified persons can become judges.  
(2) The political election procedure is meant to undermine the danger of judicial self-
selection and is part of the system of checks and balances in the German political 
system.   
(3) To prevent a dominance of the governing coalition on the selection of the judges a 
qualified majority is required and elections are the joint responsibility of the 
Bundestag and the Bundesrat.  
(4) The prohibition of reelection is designed to strengthen judicial independence. 
Yet, some analysts state that none of these provisions has been able to prevent the election 
procedure from becoming a party dominated, consociational system where judges are actually 
selected during informal meetings of the parties (e.g. meetings of the parliamentary groups in 
the Bundestag) long before the official election. Tschentscher for example argues that 
preliminary selections are made by only two or three politicians from each of the main 
parties.29 In his view, the official election by the Bundestag or the Bundestag committee 
constitutes a merely formal act which in most cases unanimously confirms the package deals 
already agreed upon earlier.30  
DATA 
The data consists of information about the complete pre-FCC careers of all 102 judges who 
worked at the Court between its establishment in 1951 and 2013, starting with their university 
education and concluding with the last position before being elected to the FCC. The yearly 
data on career stages – 50 overall – are at the centre of my analysis (see table A1). 
Furthermore, the dataset contains information on socio-demographic characteristics of the 
judges, their party-affiliation and about whether they were elected by the Bundestag or the 
Bundesrat. As expected, some stages occur more frequently than others – e.g. being a judge at 
the Federal Court of Justice is coded in more than three percent of all cases, being a judge at 
6 
 
the Federal Fiscal Court only in 0.3 percent. However, it is important to take into account 
some form of sequentiality. For example, high percentages can be explained either by the fact 
that all judges have to pass through a particular career position or they could be explained by 
only a small number of judges remaining in a stage for a long period. Using the very detailed, 
complete alphabet as a basis for sequence analysis would create results difficult to interpret. 
Hence, I structure the stages a priori in two steps. 
1) As a first step, I distinguish between positions within the judicial system (J), in politics 
(P), at universities (U), in administration (A) and other positions (O). The first letter of 
the code marks this differentiation. 
2) Since this five-stage-division is probably too rough to answer many of our questions, 
further differentiation is necessary:  
• For the large group of positions within the judicial system, I distinguish between 
the five types of jurisdiction: ordinary courts (Ord), labour courts (Lab), finance 
courts (Fis), administrative courts (Adm), and social courts (Soc).   
• F, L and S indicate positions on the federal, the Länder or a sub-Länder level 
respectively for all career stages to which such a distinction applies.  
The dataset is organised in state-sequence (STS) format: each line represents a judge 
and ‘the successive states (statuses) of an individual are given in consecutive columns’.31 In 
the remainder of the article ‘position’ and ‘status’ are used synonymously. In order to simplify 
comparisons between the biographies, I centred the careers at the appointment to the FCC (see 
table 1 to get an impression of the data). Hans Hugo Klein for example was a member of the 
Bundestag (P_F_MP), then occupied the post of parliamentary state secretary (P_F_Min)32 at 
the ministry of justice for one year before he was elected as a FCC judge. In contrast, Otto 
Seidl worked at the Federal Court of Justice (J_F_Ord) for five years before being elected as a 
FCC judge. Our last example, Karin Graßhof, shows a quite similar sequence of career stages: 
she worked at the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) in Cologne (J_L_Ord) before 
promoted to judge at the Federal Court of Justice. Four years later, she was elected to the 









SNAPSHOT FROM THE DATA – STS-FORMAT CENTERED AT THE FIRST 
APPOINTMENT 
 
name id birthyear Proposed by Elected by … a05 a04 a03 a02 a01 
Klein, Hans Hugo 59 1936 CDU/CSU Bundesrat … P_F_MP P_F_MP P_F_MP P_F_MP P_F_Min 
Seidl, Otto 60 1931 CDU/CSU Bundestag … J_F_Ord J_F_Ord J_F_Ord J_F_Ord J_F_Ord 
Graßhof, Karin 61 1937 SPD Bundestag … J_L_Ord J_L_Ord J_F_Ord J_F_Ord J_F_Ord 
 
SEQUENCE ANALYSIS – A VALUABLE METHOD FOR ELITE STUDIES 
Originally developed for analysing DNA, sequence analysis presents yet another example of a 
fruitful transfer of methods from the natural sciences to political science. Already in the 1990s 
sociologists recognized its potential for the study of biographies. 33  Sequence analysis 
facilitates the analysis of biographical data with respect to its different partitions while still 
keeping the holistic view of the complete sequence: sequence analysis simultaneously takes 
into account statuses, their order and their durations. This feature makes the method much 
more appropriate to examine complete biographies than techniques focusing solely on certain 
single statuses (such as the last position before assuming office) or approaches that cumulate 
all career-stages without taking into account their order or duration.34 A second benefit of 
sequence analysis is the use of clustering algorithms to systematically compare complete 
sequences with the aim to inductively detect general patterns within the set of observed 
careers. As a primarily exploratory approach sequence analysis would be less well-suited for a 
deductive analytical proceeding. In our case, this drawback does not present a major obstacle 
since the purpose of this article is first and foremost to identify systematic patterns in the 
data. 35  A third argument in favour of sequence analysis is that it does not require any 
distributional assumptions. Furthermore, ‘sequence analysis can play a fundamental role in 
bringing the much neglected trajectory concept, the actual 'course,' back into the life 
course’. 36  In contrast, event history analysis, the dominant methodology in life course 
research, focuses solely on single transitions. Sequence analysis is well-suited to the analysis 
of political elites and their careers, but – at least to my knowledge – has been rarely applied 
within the field of political elite studies. Up to now, none of the few analyses that have been 
carried out has been published.37    
I clarify the steps of the following sequence analysis before the data are presented. To 
exemplify the method, I will use the very rough differentiation between the five stages J, P, A, 
O and U.  
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a) Describing the complete population  
As a first step, it makes sense to present some aggregate measures of the complete population 
to get a first impression of the data. For this purpose, transversal frequency plots as well as the 
mean time persons remain in each status are presented (see fig. 1).38 
FIGURE 1 





Each column indicates the frequencies of the statuses in a given year. For example, about 
20 to 25 percent of the FCC judges pursued academic careers at universities in the 20 years 
before being elected to the FCC. The white area represents not existing values.39 These not 
existing values occur only rarely for the 20 years prior to election. In contrast, for more than 
40 years prior to election hardly any career information is available. The judge with the 
longest pre-FCC career was Hermann Höpker-Aschoff, who began his law studies in 1901, 50 
years before his election to the Court. The bar plot in the right shows the mean time during 
which judges remained in the five positions. The time spent within the judiciary is clearly the 
modal category. Even if the time spent in political and administrative positions is taken 




b) Comparing sequences and calculating similarity measures between them 
The systematic analysis of the sequences begins with calculating proximities between them. 
For this purpose, I deviate from the widely-used optimal matching procedure. Optimal 
matching (OM) has been the most common technique for the analysis of sequence data. It was 
developed in the context of genome analysis but has been applied widely in the social 
sciences.40 The OM similarity measure ‘expresses distances between sequences in terms of 
the minimal amount of energy, measured in terms of edit operations, that is required to change 
two sequences such that they become identical’.41 While this reasoning may make sense for 
analysing DNA-sequences, Dijkstra and Taris42 as well as Wu43 show that in social sciences 
applications of the OM- technique are often based on a different understanding of similarity.44 
For this reason, I apply the Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) metric proposed by 
Elzinga45 which measures the resemblance of career trajectories in a way coming close to a 
social scientists’ understanding of the term similarity. Following the same line of reasoning, 
Kerby and Real Dato also opted for the LCS-metric in their career studies.46 To illustrate the 
LCS-concept let me assume the following three example sequences:47 
X: U A U P U A  
Y: A U J O    
Z: U A P U J O O 
Position at/in: U = University; A = Administration; P = Politics; J = Judicial System; O = other position. 
 
First, I identify the LCS and its length by comparing the sequences with each other.48 The 
common subsequence ‘A U’ occurs both in X and Y when comparing the two. No other 
subsequence is common between these two sequences. The length of this common 
subsequence is two. Comparing X and Z I find one subsequence of the length four: ‘U A P U’ 
appears in X as 𝑥𝑥1𝑥𝑥2𝑥𝑥4𝑥𝑥5  and in Z as 𝑧𝑧1𝑧𝑧2𝑧𝑧3𝑧𝑧4 . The same holds true for Y and Z: The 
complete sequence of Y can be found in Z in the positions 𝑧𝑧2𝑧𝑧4𝑧𝑧5𝑧𝑧7 . Again, the longest 
common subsequence is four stages long. By using this information on the LCS, distance and 
similarity measures can be calculated.49 To account for the different lengths of the sequences,  
these distances are normalized ‘to relativize distances such that a dissimilarity of say 10 
between sequences of length 100 becomes less important than a dissimilarity of 10 between 





c) Clustering the sequences 
The next step is then to find groups of similar career patterns. Cluster analysis is not the only 
possibility for detecting such groups. Other approaches such as latent class analysis (LCA) or 
multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) could also be used. LCA can be an alternative to the 
sequence analysis approach but is problematic when investigating the longitudinal dimension 
of life course trajectories. It is also less functional compared to sequence analysis if the 
‘sequences have variations within a group due to sequencing […] and timing’.51 Within the 
sequence analysis framework, I prefer to use clustering algorithms – the standard approach in 
sequence analysis literature52 – instead of MDS because they produce relatively homogenous 
clusters, which is important for the subsequent interpretation. Particularly the Ward-method 
which is used as a clustering algorithm in this paper is known for creating very homogenous 
clusters.53  Based on exactly the same LCS-distance matrices a two-dimensional MDS, in 
contrast, produces a picture which makes it more difficult to clearly distinguish distinct career 
groups. Furthermore, by its nature, MDS always raises the question how to substantially 
interpret the dimensions. I use MDS, however, as a means to check for the robustness of the 
identified clustering solution (see next section).   
d) Testing for the optimal number of clusters 
For any given number of clusters, the hierarchical clustering algorithm tells us which 
sequence should be put in which cluster. It does not, however, identify the best clustering 
solution. To establish the optimal number of clusters, I pursue a fivefold strategy: 
For a first impression, I look at the dendrogram; secondly I make the inverse scree test54; 
thirdly I apply silhouette analysis55; and fourthly, as recommended by Piccarreta and Lior56, I 
inspect whether the elements of the found clusters are also situated within reasonably close 
range in a two dimensional MDS-plot.  Figure 2 shows the results for each of the four 
different stages. The dendrogram as well as the inverse scree test (elbow criterion) favour 
either a two- or a four-cluster-solution. Silhouettes can be interpreted in the following way: If 
the right-hand side clearly dominates and the average si-value is relatively high, the cluster 
can be regarded as homogenous. If, however, a significant proportion of all cases within a 
cluster is found on the left-hand side and the average si-value is low or even negative, the 
clustering solution does not fit the data very well. The silhouette analysis shows that the 
three–cluster-solution would produce two quite homogenous clusters and one that is less 
uniform. The four-cluster-solution again produces one very fuzzy cluster while the other three 
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clusters are rather homogenous. The MDS plot labelled according to the four-cluster-solution 
also shows that cluster 1 is much more heterogeneous than the other three which separate 
quite well from each other. 
FIGURE 2 
DENDROGRAM, INVERSE SCREE PLOT, SILHOUETTES AND MDS-PLOT 
 
 
Yet, instead of following these tests blindly, in a fifth step I check whether the clustering 
solution with the best fit from a mathematical point of view also produces a meaningful result 
when applied to specific research questions. I advocate an approach that favours meaningful 




e) Presenting the clusters 
After the best-fitting clustering solution has been identified, the clusters are then presented in 
the form of transversal frequency and regular sequence plots. As an example, figure 3 shows 
the two most homogenous clusters from the four-cluster-solution with these kinds of plots. 
The transversal frequencies help to get an idea of the general patterns within a cluster, 
whereas the regular sequence plots show for the career of each judge which career-steps 
follow upon each other. 
FIGURE 3  







Last Position before Coming to the FCC 
Before discussing the sequences in detail, I take a short look at the last position the judges 
held just before being elected to the FCC (see table 2). The majority of the judges were 
university professors, had a position within the federal or Länder administration or worked at 
one of the highest courts (particularly at the Federal Court of Justice and the Federal 
Administrative Court). Only 17 out of 102 left a political position to become a judge at the 
FCC. The opposite is true when we look at the chief judges of both senates (the president and 
the vice president of the FCC): Eight out of the 11 chief judges worked as a politician just 
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before being elected to the FCC. And, even more interesting, not even one president or vice 
president came directly from an administration position or one of the major courts.58 
TABLE 2 
LAST POSITION BEFPORE BEING ELECTED TO THE FCC 
 
Last position  N President/ Vice President  
University professor 24 2 
Judge at the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) 17  
Judge at the Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG) 9  
Administration Länder level 8  
Administration Federal level 7  
Minister Länder level 6 3 
Member of the Bundestag 4 3 
Lawyer 3  
Member of a Länder Parliament 3  
Judge at the Federal Fiscal Court (BFH) 2  
Judge at the Federal Labour Court (BAG) 2  
Judge at the Federal Social Court (BSG) 2  
Prime minister of a Land 2 1 
Judge at a constitutional court of the Länder 1 1 
Member of the European Parliament 1 1 
Other Positions (single mentions) 11  




Using the complete alphabet for the sequence analysis would produce an extremely fuzzy 
picture that is difficult to interpret. It is therefore advisable to reduce the number of statuses as 
explained above:  
1) To test the influence of the different types of jurisdiction, I distinguish between 
administrative, fiscal, social, labour and ordinary courts. Further categories tested 
alongside are administration, times in education (student, trainee lawyer), staff at courts 
(lawyer and state attorney), university, and a residual category of ‘other positions’.   
2) To test the influence of the different levels of the German federal system, I distinguish 
between administrative, judicial, and political positions at the federal, the Länder and 
the sub-Länder level.  
Both reduced alphabets can be found in table A2 in the annex.  
Aggregate characteristics for the differentiation by type of jurisdiction.  
The overall pattern within the sequence data can be recognized by inspecting the transversal 
frequencies (see fig. 4). Some conclusions can already be drawn: First, 10 to 20 years before 
becoming a FCC judge, a rather large number of judges worked as lawyers (ca. 15 per cent). 
Immediately before being elected to the FCC their share drops to only 2 per cent. This sharp 
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decline suggests that being a lawyer is a good starting point for some trajectories leading to 
the FCC, but after that, other positions (e.g. in politics, administration or the judiciary) have to 
follow. Second, the opposite is true for those judges who have held positions in politics and 
the administrative courts as their numbers increase prior to FCC election. Third, only judges 
socialized within the ordinary or the administrative jurisdiction play a considerable role in 
filling the positions at the FCC. The second plot in figure 4 shows the mean time spent at each 
career stage. Again, it becomes obvious that of the five types of jurisdiction the ordinary and 
the administrative jurisdiction matter most for career advancement.   
FIGURE 4 
TRANSVERSAL FREQUENCIES AND MEAN TIME  
(DIFFERENTIATION BY TYPE OF JURISDICTION) 
 
 
Cluster analysis for different types of jurisdiction 
After calculating the matrix of distances based on the LCS-metric, I cluster them using the 
Ward-method. From a mere inspection of the dendrogram (see figure O1 in the online-annex), 
it is not completely self-evident what the optimal number of clusters would be. The inverse 
scree test (see fig A1) favours either a two- or a five-cluster-solution. According to the 
silhouettes (see fig. A1), the two-cluster-solution produces the most homogenous clusters. All 
of the other solutions show at least one cluster that is very fuzzy. However, the two cluster 
solution does not tell much of a story: The result would be to end up with one cluster 
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consisting only of persons who had been working at universities before being elected to the 
FCC and another cluster containing all the other persons. I thus opted for the five-cluster-
solution as it allows a better interpretation of the data. The MDS-plot (see fig A1) shows that 
the university cluster 3 is clearly separated, while the other clusters exhibit more overlap. 
Figure 5 presents the respective transversal frequencies.59 
The last three clusters show one clearly dominant colour (Uni; J_Ord; J_Adm) whereas the 
first two are relatively fuzzy. Still, each of the fuzzy clusters also includes one status that 
steadily increases up to the point of being elected to the FCC. In the case of the first cluster, 
political positions are dominant; in the case of the second administrative positions prevail. 
The first cluster illustrates that judges with a political background often also worked as 
lawyers or in other positions (residual category). Within all five clusters, these two categories 
come along most often with the category ‘political positions’. This fact makes the 
combination of these three positions another specific pathway to the Court – although the 
cluster itself is relatively fuzzy. The second cluster includes large component of 
administrative positions and FCC judges who worked at the federal fiscal, labour and social 
courts (these three courts make up such small shares that they cannot be labelled in fig. 5). 
The third cluster is the most homogenous one. It consists primarily of persons working in 
academia. The fourth cluster contains FCC judges who previously worked within the ordinary 
judiciary. A look at the sequence plots in the online-annex (see fig. O2) shows that careers in 
academia and at ordinary courts are less volatile than in the other clusters where there is more 
change from one status to another. Cluster five depicts yet another path to the Court: it 
contains FCC judges who worked at administrative courts before election to the Court, often 






TRANSVERSAL FREQUENCIES FOR THE FIVE CLUSTER SOLUTION 






Aggregate characteristics for the differentiation by level of the federal system  
The second differentiation reduces the complete alphabet according to the three levels of the 
German federal system: the federal, the Länder and the sub-Länder level. Figure 6 shows the 
transversal frequency plot for the complete sample and the mean time in each status. For the 
positions in the judiciary advancement is gradual and steady: FCC judges from this domain 
start their careers at a court on the sub-Länder level, progress to the Länder level, and finally 
to the federal level from where they enter the Court. Only very few are elected directly from 
the lower judiciary levels. For positions in administration and politics no such pattern can be 
observed. In both cases, the majority of positions held are at the Länder and the federal level, 
particularly shortly before the election to the FCC. In contrast, the sub-Länder level 
contributes only marginally to the overall frequencies in these two groups. This pattern can 
also be seen by looking at the mean time in each status. For the judiciary it is the other way 
around: here, the judges work for the longest time at the federal level, followed by the sub-
Länder level. Nevertheless, compared to positions at universities, the time judges remain in 





TRANSVERSAL FREQUENCIES AND MEAN TIME  
(DIFFERENTIATION BY LEVEL OF FEDERAL SYSTEM) 
 
 
Cluster Analysis for different levels of the federal system 
I calculate the matrix of LCS-distances and cluster them using the Ward-method. The 
dendrogram (see fig. O1 in the online-annex) as well as the inverse scree test (see fig A2) do 
not produce a clear result. A two- or four-cluster-solution seems most adequate. The 
silhouettes favour a two- or three-cluster-solution (see fig A2). Yet, I present the more 
detailed four-cluster-solution because the two fuzzy clusters the clustering algorithm produces 
– in addition to the two homogenous clusters (university and judiciary) – can also be included 
in the interpretation: these fuzzy clusters primarily contain the political and administrative 
careers. The MDS-plot roughly confirms the results of the cluster analysis (see fig. A2). 
Marking the careers according to the four-cluster-solution shows that the careers of one 
cluster are mostly situated quite near to each other. Cluster 3 is again clearly distinct from the 
other clusters. The transversal frequencies for these four clusters can be found in the online-
annex (fig. O3). In order to test whether the federal system in Germany impacts the types of 
career paths, I draw sequence plots for all four clusters, focusing separately on positions 
within the judiciary, administration and politics (see fig. 7). This representation illustrates that 
in nearly all cases the judicial career path presents a steady march through the different levels 
of the federal system, from the sub-Länder to the Länder and finally to the federal level before 
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eventually becoming a judge at the FCC (from left to right the careers take on darker colours). 
Such a career pattern cannot be delineated for judges coming from an administrative or 
political background. Here, switching between levels is less common and often the judges 
remain at just one level – mostly Länder or federal level. 
FIGURE 7 
SEQUENCE PLOTS FOR THE FIVE CLUSTER SOLUTION  






Effects of the electing body or the nominating party? 
Previous research (e.g. by Christine Landfried61) reveals that the professional background of 
FCC judges is diverse but no systematic analysis has tried to link differences in judges’ 
biographies with  the nominating party or electing body (Bundesrat/Bundestag). It could, for 
example, be assumed that the Bundesrat favours persons working at the Länder 
administrations as they are more familiar with the particular problems the Länder are dealing 
with. Or it might be the case that different parties prefer certain pre-FCC career paths: for 
example, one could imagine the SPD to promote persons with a background in the social and 
labour judiciaries in order to boost these typical social democratic issue areas in the highest 
court. It is equally possible, however, that the informal and consociational nomination and 
election procedure, is not conducive for differentiation. To check for effects of the electing 
body or nominating party, I use the alphabet reduced by the different levels of the federal 
system (see table A2). I compare the transversal frequency plots for FCC judges elected by 
the election committee of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat (see fig. 8) respectively. Likewise, 
I compare the frequency plots for judges nominated by the CDU/CSU with those for judges 
nominated by the SPD (see fig. 9).62 The graphs look almost identical. The career patterns of 
FCC judges do not vary significantly according to the body that elected them or the party that 
nominated them. If anything, the Bundesrat elects more judges with a background in 
administration (contrary to what was expected, many of them holding positions at the federal 
level), while the Bundestag elects slightly more judges with a background in the federal 
judiciary. Differences are similarly small when I disaggregate the data according to 
nominating parties: slightly more FCC judges with a background in academia have been 
nominated by the SPD, whereas the judges proposed by CDU/CSU tend to have worked 
longer at courts at the sub-Länder level. These minor differences notwithstanding, the overall 
congruency is remarkable. Using the other reduced alphabet (by type of jurisdiction) produces 
similar results. Here, the only noteworthy discrepancy is the one expected: FCC judges with a 
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Relatively few scholars have analysed the career characteristics of FCC judges which is 
surprising, considering their relevance in the judicial and political system. I argue that more 
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attention should be paid to the composition of the judges as they are important actors and, 
indeed, are often considered political actors in their own right. A systematic analysis of the 
career paths of the judges – prior to their work at the FCC – contributes to our understanding 
of the politicization of constitutional courts. I proposed sequence analysis as a well-suited 
technique for the systematic study of biographies as it enables the identification of general 
career patterns within the careers and, at the same time, provides a holistic picture of entire 
career paths. Sequence analysis was applied to a new data set which encompasses the career 
stages of all FFC judges between 1951 and 2013. In what follows, I summarize the findings 
and connect them to the four research questions posted earlier. 
1) Can distinct career paths leading to the FCC be identified? 
Four relatively distinct career clusters emerged and they centred on positions within 
academia, administration, politics and ordinary courts. These different career paths reflect 
diverse socialization and professional experiences which, in turn, may influence the Court’s 
rulings. The academia cluster and the ordinary courts cluster are both very homogenous – i.e. 
most of these FCC judges had solely worked at universities (or ordinary courts respectively) 
before election to the FCC. The other two clusters show considerable fuzziness. 
Administrative background is, for example, often combined with positions at administrative 
courts. Judges with a certain background in politics have in most cases passed through a 
number of other positions too, e.g. at law firms, or within private business. Their way to the 
Court is thus much less standardised compared to the careers within the ordinary courts or 
academia clusters. 
2) Do pre-FCC careers involve a high degree involvement in political positions, thus 
suggesting a possible politicization of the Court?   
Former politicians make up about 23 per cent of all FCC judges. At first this finding suggests 
that this career type, being by far not the modal category within the Court, may not be that 
important. However, judges with a background in politics have a much higher chance of 
obtaining one of the prestigious posts of chief judge of the Court. Judges whose careers have 
been confined to the judicial arena have a much lower chance to advance to the president or 
vice-president of the FCC. The significance of this finding in terms of a possible politicization 




3) Does a federal system provide for particular career paths in the judiciary and what are 
the implications? 
FCC judges with a career confined solely to the judicial sphere often pass through all the 
levels of the federal system before election to the FCC, beginning at the sub-Länder level, 
then proceeding to the Länder,  and finally the federal level. FCC judges with a background in 
politics or administration differ. They hardly switch between positions at the Länder and at 
the federal level; the sub-Länder level is irrelevant for their careers. Put another way, political 
or administrative pre-FCC positions at the Länder level seem to be sufficient for advancement 
whereas a federal judiciary experience is a requirement for those judges whose careers are 
confined to the legal sector. This finding can to some extent be explained by the official 
provision that six out of the sixteen FCC judges are promoted from one of the highest federal 
courts. Nevertheless, it does not explain why nearly all of the FCC judges with a judicial 
background have worked at one of the five federal courts. Appointment to one of these courts 
and, in particular, the Federal Court of Justice and the Federal Administrative Court, is an 
important stepping stone in the career of those potential FCC judges with a background in the 
judiciary. At least for this subcategory of FCC judges, this finding can help to determine a 
confined pool of potential candidates.     
4) Are there any differences between the judges’ careers with respect to the party that 
nominated them and the selecting body (Bundestag or Bundesrat)?  
Very few differences in the career pattern between FCC judges can be discerned with respect 
to the nominating party (CDU/CSU or SPD) and the selecting body, which is in line with 
earlier studies which have emphasized the consociational character of the nomination and 
election procedures. Still it is striking that virtually no differences exist in career patterns, 
independent of whether the CDU/CSU or the SPD nominated FCC judges. One exception 
refers to the selection of judges who have served on social and labour courts: almost all have 
been nominated by the SPD. These findings suggest that differences in party preferences for 
FCC judges are minimal but not completely negligible. 
Although not addressed in this paper, data on the careers of FCC judges may also provide 
insights into decision-making processes at the Court. Most judicial decision making studies to 
date on the FCC rely on party affiliation but not on attitudes and preferences deducted from 
previous career experiences. 64 Career data should enable scholars to test, in a more rigorous 
way, rational choice as well as attitudinal models of judicial decision-making – well known 
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from research on the US Supreme Court – also for the German FCC. Knowing about the 
input-side is, of course, only one side of the coin: decision-making studies also need to 
measure the dependent variable, i.e. the decisions of the Court. This is complicated in the case 
of the FCC, as individual votes which could be related to the judges’ career data are in general 
not recorded. To circumvent this problem one could use dissenting opinions (Sondervoten) 
which are recorded for each judge individually. They are, however, rarely used, hampering 
their usability for representative studies of FCC decision-making.  
On a methodological level, this article has illustrated the usefulness of sequence analysis for 
career and elite studies. But sequence analysis is not a panacea for all elite studies. For 
example, the determination which distance metric is most appropriate depends on the research 
question. In this article, I argue that the Longest Common Subsequence metric represents the 
idea of similarity between careers better than the often used Optimal Matching metric but this 
reasoning does not necessarily apply to other elite studies. In addition, sequence analysis 
allows for some analysis but is first and foremost a descriptive approach. This can be seen as 
an advantage at the first stages of a research project, as in the case of this article. The 
graphical representations are easy to read and illustrate findings that would be difficult to 
detect otherwise. For further research the full amount of information included in the sequence 
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Code Position % of total  
Administration 
A_CJ position in church administration  0.27 
A_F administration federal level 3.56 
A_L administration Länder level 6.59 
A_S administration sub-Länder level 2.11 
Judicial System 
J_CJ employed in church jurisprudence 0.21 
J_F_Adm judge at the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht BVerwG) 3.29 
J_F_Fis judge at the Federal Fiscal Court (Bundesfinanzhof BFH) 0.30 
J_F_Lab judge at the Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht BAG) 0.62 
J_F_Ord judge at the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof BGH) or federal public prosecutor (Bundesanwaltschaft) 3.15 
J_F_Soc judge at the Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht BSG) 0.50 
J_L_Adm judge at a Superior Administrative Court (Oberverwaltungsgericht OVG) 1.37 
J_L_Fis judge at a Fiscal Court (Finanzgericht FG)  0.39 
J_L_Lab judge at a Superior State Labour Courts (Landesarbeitsgericht LAG) 0.09 
J_L_Ord judge at the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht OLG) 3.03 
J_L_Soc judge at a Superior State Social Courts (Landessozialgereicht LSG) 0.59 
J_Law Lawyer 5.49 
J_S_Adm judge at an Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht VwG) 0.98 
J_S_Lab judge at a Labour Court (Arbeitsgericht ArG) 0.12 
J_S_Soc judge at a Social Court (Sozialgericht SG) 0.24 
J_S1_Ord judge at a Amtsgericht (AG) 2.34 
J_S2_Ord judge at a Landgericht (LG) 4.16 
J_SA state Attorney 0.80 
J_St_F staff at a Federal Court 3.27 
J_St_L staff at a Länder Court 0.21 
J_St_LO staff at a law office 0.33 
J_St_S staff at a sub-Länder level court 0.06 
J_TL trainee Lawyer (up to the second state examination) 8.01 
Other Positions 
O_Auth free author 0.21 
O_CC staff at chamber of commerce 0.06 
O_Econ position in the private economy 1.45 
O_Exile exile during  Nazi regime 1.51 
O_IO employed at an International Organisation 0.09 
O_Media position in the Media (e.g. public broadcasting) 0.15 
O_NJE non judicial employment (especially during Nazi-regime when the judge was not allowed to work in jurisprudence) 0.47 
O_Stu student (up to the first state examination) 14.37 
O_Union staff of Unions and employee organisations 0.24 
O_War participation in war as soldier, prisoner of war. military administration … 4.01 
Politics 
P_EU_MP member of the European parliament 0.09 
P_F_Min federal minister (or parliamentary state secretary) 0.09 
P_F_MP member of the Bundestag (or parliamentary council = Parlamentarischer Rat) 2.20 
P_L_Min Länder minister (or State Secretary Staatssekretär) 1.51 
P_L_MP member of a Landtag 1.22 
P_L_PM prime minister (Ministerpräsident) 0.65 
P_Party working for party (e.g. as an consultant for the parliamentary group in the Bundestag) 0.09 
P_S political position on sub-Länder level (e.g. mayor. member of municipal council. district administrator = Landrat) 0.53 
P_SA working for the NSDAP, SS or SA (Sturmabteilung) 0.15 
Academia 
U_P professor at law faculty /or Max Planck 10.09 
U_P_CJ professor in church law 0.59 
U_S academic staff at law faculty / or Max Planck 7.95 




THE TWO REDUCED ALPHABETS  
I. Differentiation by types of jurisdiction II. Differentiation by level of the federal system 
Code Position % of total  Code Position % of total  
Judge at a court Federal level 
J_Adm Administrative Courts 5.64 Adm_F Administration Federal Level 3.56 
J_Fis Fiscal Courts 0.68 Jud_F Judiciary Federal Level 6.59 
J_Lab Labour Courts 0.83 Pol_F Politics Federal Level 2.11 
J_Ord Ordinary Courts 12.67 Länder level 
J_Soc Social Courts 1.34 Adm_L Administration Länder Level 7.87 
Positions not at a court Jud_L Judiciary Länder Level 5.46 
Adm Administration 12.53 Pol_L Politics Länder Level 7.84 
Edu Education (Student. Trainee Lawyer) 22.38 Sub-Länder Level 
Law Staff / Lawyer / State Attorney 10.36 Adm_S Administration Sub-Länder Level 2.37 
Oth Other Positions 8.19 Jud_S Judiciary Sub-Länder Level 3.38 
Pol Politics 6.53 Pol_S Politics Sub-Länder Level 0.53 
Uni University 18.85 Further Positions 
   Edu Education 22.38 
   Law Lawyer 10.36 
   Oth Other Positions 8.70 
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